EXHIBIT(S) - F (Motion #008) - EBT Testimony of Davies- Johnson December 05, 2022 (2024)

Case

Carol Vogt v. Vici Properties, Inc., Mgm Resorts International

Jul 23, 2024 |Torts - Other Negligence (Slip and Fall) |Torts - Other Negligence (Slip and Fall) |034407/2024

Case

Progressive Garden State Insurance Company as subrogee of Arlene Johnston v. Phila Cargo Llc, Jonas Pierre

Jul 25, 2024 |Torts - Motor Vehicle |Torts - Motor Vehicle |034497/2024

Case

Consberson Louisthelmy v. Spring Hill Community Ambulance, Rosalia Elizabeth Beltran

Jul 20, 2024 |Torts - Motor Vehicle |Torts - Motor Vehicle |034302/2024

Case

Henry Jean v. Evan S. Klein, Carissa B. Cates

Jul 23, 2024 |Torts - Motor Vehicle |Torts - Motor Vehicle |034371/2024

Case

Edison Henriquez-Pena v. Edward R. Sudol

Jul 22, 2024 |Torts - Motor Vehicle |Torts - Motor Vehicle |034309/2024

Case

Taruge J. Hanco*ck v. Rockland County Solid Waste Management Authority, Rockland Green

Jul 23, 2024 |Torts - Other (Premises) |Torts - Other (Premises) |034372/2024

Case

Kathryn Bleier v. Gbr Two Crossfield Limited Liability Company, Gibraltar Management Co. Inc.

Jul 24, 2024 |Torts - Other (Premises) |Torts - Other (Premises) |034427/2024

Case

Angel Luis Rivera, Vianela Mejia And Timothy M. Corcino v. Michael Rosenberger

Jul 25, 2024 |Torts - Motor Vehicle |Torts - Motor Vehicle |034506/2024

Case

Sergo Jean Louis v. Friedrich L. Kastner, Rudolf Steiner Fellowship Foundation, Inc.

Jul 25, 2024 |Torts - Motor Vehicle |Torts - Motor Vehicle |034545/2024

Ruling

Jul 22, 2024 |CGC24614333

Matter on the Law & Motion calendar for Monday, July 22, 2024, Line 9. 2 - DEFENDANT COSTCO WHOLESALE CORPORATION's MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT. Granted in part. (The Court's complete tentative ruling has been emailed to the parties.) For the 9:30 a.m. Law & Motion calendar, all attorneys and parties may appear in Department 302 remotely. Remote hearings will be conducted by videoconference using Zoom. To appear remotely at the hearing, go to the court's website at sfsuperiorcourt.org under "Online Services," navigate to "Tentative Rulings," and click on the appropriate link, or dial the corresponding phone number. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to contestdept302tr@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. The subject line of the email shall include the line number, case name and case number. The text of the email shall include the name and contact information, including email address, of the attorney or party who will appear at the hearing. Counsel for the prevailing party is required to prepare a proposed order which repeats verbatim the substantive portion of the tentative ruling and must email it to contestdept302tr@sftc.org prior to the hearing even if the tentative ruling is not contested. The court no longer provides a court reporter in the Law & Motion Department. Parties may retain their own reporter, who may appear in the courtroom or remotely. A retained reporter must be a California certified court reporter (CSR), for only a CSR's transcript may be used in California courts. If a CSR is being retained, include in your email all of the following: their name, CSR and telephone numbers, and their individual work email address. =(302/CK)

Ruling

MACKENZIE WOO VS. UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO ET AL

Jul 26, 2024 |CGC23605270

Matter on the Discovery Calendar for Friday, Jul-26-2024, Line 5, DEFENDANT UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO'S Motion For Leave To Take Subsequent Deposition Of Plaintiff Mackenzie Woo (Code Civ. Proc. 2025.610(B)). Pro Tem Judge Aaron Minnis, a member of the California State Bar who meets all the requirements set forth in CRC 2.812 to serve as a temporary judge, has been assigned to hear this motion. Prior to the hearing all parties to the motion will be asked to sign a stipulation agreeing that the motion may be heard by the Pro Tem Judge. If all parties to the motion sign the stipulation, the hearing will proceed before the Judge Pro Tem who will decide the motion with the same authority as a Superior Court Judge. If a party appears by telephone, the stipulation may be signed via fax or consent to sign given by email. If not all parties to the motion sign the stipulation, the Pro Tem Judge will hold a hearing on the motion and, based on the papers submitted by the parties and the hearing, issue a report in the nature of a recommendation to the Dept. 302 Judge, who will then decide the motion. If a party does not appear at the hearing, the party will be deemed to have stipulated that the motion will be decided by the Pro Tem Judge with the same authority as a Superior Court Judge. The Pro Tem Judge has issued the following tentative ruling: Granted. Within 10 days Plaintiff shall appear for deposition at a mutually convenient date and time to testify regarding the previously redacted information in the SFGH records. For the 9:00 a.m. Discovery calendar, all attorneys and parties are required to appear remotely. Hearings will be conducted by videoconference using Zoom. To appear at the hearing, go to the court's website at sfsuperiorcourt.org under "Online Services," navigate to "Tentative Rulings," and click on the appropriate link (DISCOVERY, DEPARTMENT 302 DAILY AT 9:00 A.M.), or dial the corresponding number and use the meeting ID, and password for Discovery Department 302. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to aaron@minnisandsmallets.com with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. The subject line of the email shall include the line number, case name and case number. If the tentative ruling is not contested, the parties are deemed to have stipulated to the Pro Tem hearing the motion and the Pro Tem will sign an order confirming the tentative ruling. The prevailing party is required to prepare a proposed order repeating verbatim the substantive portion of the tentative ruling and must e-mail it to the Judge Pro Tem. The court no longer provides a court reporter in the Discovery Department. Parties may retain their own reporter, who may appear remotely. A retained reporter must be a California certified court reporter (CSR), for only a CSR's transcript may be used in California courts. If a CSR is being retained, include in your email all of the following: their name, CSR and telephone numbers, and their individual work email address. =(302/JPT)

Ruling

SORUM, et al. vs ALBERTSONS COMPANIES, INC., INDIVIDUALLY, et...

Jul 26, 2024 |Civil Unlimited (Asbestos) |23CV031203

23CV031203: SORUM, et al. vs ALBERTSONS COMPANIES, INC., INDIVIDUALLY, et al. 07/26/2024 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by KOLMAR LABORATORIES, INC (Defendant) in Department 18specifications required these products to meet certain requirements, the subcontractor had someflexibility in determining what specific products to use and routinely incorporated provision ofthese products into its subcontracting bids. The Court of Appeal stated that the key issue waswhether defendant subcontractor was “in a position to enhance product safety or exert pressureon the manufacturer to promote that end, and bear the costs of compensating for injuries.” (243Cal.App.4th 249, 262.)Endicott is the case most favorable to Defendant. In Endicott, plaintiff alleged that the seatbelton his 1967 Nissan 411 broke or ruptured during a vehicle crash thereby worsening his injuries.The plaintiff sued both the car manufacturer Nissan Motor Corp. (“Nissan” or “Datsun”) and theindependent contractor (“Installer”) who installed the seatbelts into Nissan vehicles. Theseatbelts were manufactured by Nissan, were delivered to Installer in the trunks of the vehiclesinto which Installer was to install the seatbelts at locations marked by Nissan “according to[Nissan’s] directions,” and Nissan “supplied all materials for attaching the belts.” There was noevidence at trial to support a finding that Installer had reason to know the seatbelts supplied byNissan might be defective. (73 Cal.App.3d 917, 925.)In upholding a trial verdict against plaintiff, the Endicott Court of Appeal stated in relevant part:“[W]e find no evidence that Installer was an integral part of the overall marketing enterprise thatproduces Datsun automobiles or that it played any significant role in placing Datsun’s product inthe stream of commerce that could render Installer liable in tort for defects in Datsun'sautomobiles. As a mere provider of services Installer is not liable for defects in the product. Noris there anything in this record to indicate that Installer should have recognized the possibilitiesof misadventure that might arise from proximity of seat belt and metal L-bracket,” a positedcause of the seatbelt rupture. (73 Cal.App.3d at 930.)Defendant presents evidence from the deposition of its employee, Ronald Yakupcin, who workedfor Defendant throughout the period of Mr. Sorum’s alleged use of Defendant’s products. (DIOEExh. 10.) He testified that throughout the relevant period Defendant was in the business of“contract manufacturing” colored cosmetics for other cosmetics companies. He further testifiedthat:“we would take our customer's formula, manufacture that formula, fill it into their packaging andship it to where they wanted us to ship it. Or, the customer purchased our formula which wasthen filled into their packaging and shipped to their points of distribution.” (Id. at p. 266:15-25.)Mr. Yakupcin further testified that Defendant did not sell any of its products under its own labelsor brand names. He also testified that typically customers would provide Defendant with theproduct formula, the manufacturing instructions, the packaging, filling and packaginginstructions and the shipment instructions. (Id. at pp. 267:3-269:6; compare to p. 266:15-25quoted above.) SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA23CV031203: SORUM, et al. vs ALBERTSONS COMPANIES, INC., INDIVIDUALLY, et al. 07/26/2024 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by KOLMAR LABORATORIES, INC (Defendant) in Department 18Defendant does not provide testimony from Mr. Yakupcin regarding whether customers suppliedall of the ingredients Defendant used to make the customer’s cosmetics, whether the customersspecified the specific talcs to be used in each product or if Defendant could choose amongsimilar talcs that met the customer’s specifications. Mr. Yakupcin testified that in some instancescustomers bought Defendant’s formulas, with respect to which Defendant was implicitlychoosing what talcs or other ingredients should go into the formulas. He also testified thatDefendant shipped the finished products to customers’ “points of distribution,” indicatingDefendant was in the chain of distribution for the finished products eventually reachingconsumers like Mr. Sorum. Further, unlike Endicott, where the third-party contractorINSTALLER was merely installing a single discreet part of a Nissan automobile furnished to itby Nissan, here Defendant was apparently assembling, manufacturing or blending the entire, at-issue scented cosmetic talc products. If Defendant played any role in deciding what cosmetictalcs went into any cosmetic talc formula it sold to a customer, then this case would fall underthe rule of Hernandezcueva, rather than Endicott.The Court finds that Defendant’s moving evidence does not create undisputed material factspursuant to which Defendant is entitled to summary adjudication of Plaintiffs’ Strict LiabilityCause of Action as a matter of law.Wherefore, the Court DENIES Defendant’s MSA of Plaintiffs’ First Cause of Action for StrictLiability.4. MSA of Plaintiffs’ Punitive Damages Claim.To be entitled to an award of punitive damages, a plaintiff must show by clear and convincingevidence that the defendant is guilty of malice, oppression or fraud. (Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(a).)The definition of “malice” includes “despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendantwith a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (§ 3294(c).) “Despicableconduct” is conduct that is so vile, base, or contemptible that it would be looked down on anddespised by reasonable people. (See CACI 3946.)A finding of malice does not require an actual intent to cause harm. “Conscious disregard for thesafety of another may be sufficient where the defendant is aware of the probable dangerousconsequences of his or her conduct and he or she willfully fails to avoid such consequences.Malice may be proved either expressly through direct evidence or by implication throughindirect evidence from which the jury draws inferences.” (Pfiefer v. John Crane, Inc. (2013) 220Cal.App.4th 1270, 1299.)Further, a defendant’s “prolonged failure” to take adequate measures to protect people whoworked with its products against a known hazard to their health and safety may justify aconclusion that the conduct was malicious, fraudulent, or oppressive. (Bankhead v. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 23CV031203: SORUM, et al. vs ALBERTSONS COMPANIES, INC., INDIVIDUALLY, et al. 07/26/2024 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by KOLMAR LABORATORIES, INC (Defendant) in Department 18ArvinMeritor, Inc.) (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 68, 86.) However, the Cal. Supreme Court has statedthat by addition of the word “despicable” to Civ. Code § 3294(c), “the statute plainly indicatesthat absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, “malice” requires more than a “willful and conscious”disregard of the plaintiffs' interests. The additional component of ‘despicable conduct’ must befound.” (College Hospital, Inc. v. Sup.Ct. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.)A clear and convincing evidentiary standard applies to evidence presented by a plaintiff inopposition to a motion for summary adjudication of punitive damages claims. (Basich v. AllstateIns. Co. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1118-1119.) However, the clear and convincingevidentiary standard “does not impose on a plaintiff the obligation to ‘prove’ a case for punitivedamages at summary [adjudication].” (Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. Sup.Ct. (2018) 24Cal.App.5th 1150, 1158-1159.) “Summary ... adjudication ‘on the issue of punitive damages isproper’ only ‘when no reasonable jury could find the plaintiff’s evidence to be clear andconvincing proof of malice, fraud or oppression.’” (Ibid.)Further, a defendant moving for summary adjudication must still make an initial prima facieshowing that no disputed issues of material fact exist such that defendant is entitled to summaryadjudication as a matter of law in order to shift the burden of production to plaintiff to presentclear and convincing evidence of malice, oppression or fraud. (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co.(2001) 25 Cal. 4th 826, 850.)Defendant seeks to meet its initial burden of production as to Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claimby pointing to Plaintiffs’ assertedly “factually devoid” responses to Defendant’s sufficientlycomprehensive written and deposition discovery. (Andrews, supra.) Here, Defendant cites to itsSROG No. 4 seeking all facts supporting Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim. (DIOE Exh. 5.)Plaintiffs’ Response to SROG No. 4 incorporates by reference their prior Response to SROG No.3, seeking all facts supporting Plaintiffs’ claims that Defendant is liable for Plaintiffs’ injuriesand damages generally. Plaintiffs’ Response to SROG No. 3 is “factually devoid” as toPlaintiffs’ punitive damages claim because it contains no specific facts to support a punitivedamages claim. Instead, the Response states that Plaintiffs “contend” Defendant was aware ofthe asbestos-related hazards of its products but did not provide warnings. The Response alsocites to historical documents supporting a claim that Defendant should have known aboutpossible asbestos contamination of talc and the hazards of respirable asbestos, facts supporting anegligence theory, rather than stating any specific facts regarding what exactly Defendant knewat any specific time. (Ibid.)Although Defendant did not serve any SROG seeking identification of either all witnesses or alldocuments, Defendant did serve Request for Production of Documents (“RFPD”) No. 4 seekingproduction of all documents supporting Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim. Plaintiffs’ Responseto RFPD No. 4 incorporates by reference Plaintiffs’ Response to RFPD No. 1, seekingproduction of all documents supporting Plaintiffs’ Strict Liability Cause of Action. Plaintiffs’ SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 23CV031203: SORUM, et al. vs ALBERTSONS COMPANIES, INC., INDIVIDUALLY, et al. 07/26/2024 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by KOLMAR LABORATORIES, INC (Defendant) in Department 18Response to RFPD No. 1, instead of providing a response complying with CCP § 2031.210(a),provides a list of responsive documents, specifically, Mr. Sorum’s deposition testimonytranscript and exhibits thereto, Plaintiffs’ Responses to Joint Defense Interrogatories and Mr.Sorum’s medical and billing records. (DIOE Exh. 6.) Because none of the identified documentsis reasonably likely to contain information to support a punitive damages claim, the Court findsPlaintiffs’ Response to RFPD Nos. 1 and 4, functionally equivalent to a factually devoidresponse to an SROG seeking identification of all documents supporting Plaintiffs’ punitivedamages claim.The Court finds that Defendant has met its initial burden of production on summary adjudicationof Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim. Because asbestos torts plaintiffs always prove theirpunitive damages claims by means of the defendant’s corporate records or the depositiontestimony of the corporate defendant’s persons most qualified (“PMQ”), officers or employees,Plaintiffs’ inability to state any specific facts in response to SROG No. 4 or to identify anyspecific documents in response to RFPD No. 4 is sufficient to create an inference that Plaintiffsdo not have and cannot reasonably obtain any evidence to support their punitive damages claim.Thus, the burden shifts to Plaintiffs to present evidence in support of their punitive damagesclaim sufficient to create triable issues of material fact under a clear and convincing evidentiarystandard.Plaintiffs present no evidence in Opposition to support Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim.Instead, Plaintiffs request a CCP § 437c(h) continuance to complete the depositions ofdefendants Calvin Klein, Conopco and Gucci, assumably customers of Defendant.The Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ request for a CCP § 437c(h) continuance with respect toPlaintiffs’ punitive damages claim against Defendant. Plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration fails toexplain how the depositions of other defendants is reasonably calculated to lead to the discoveryof admissible evidence of Defendant’s senior executives’ malice, oppression or fraud. Plaintiffspresent no evidence that they have not had a full and fair opportunity to depose Defendant’scorporate witnesses pursuant to the express terms of the Court’s 3/12/2024 Order grantingPlaintiffs’ Motion for Trial Preference. Instead, in the unlikely event that the depositions ofCalvin Klein’s, Conopco’s or Gucci’s PMQs produces evidence that Defendant’s seniorexecutives acted with malice, oppression or fraud toward Mr. Sorum or persons similarlysituated, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs leave to seek reconsideration of the Court’s ruling onDefendant’s MSA of the punitive damages claim based on later-discovered evidence.Wherefore, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s MSA of Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim.The Court OVERRULES Defendant’s Opposition Objection No. 1 that Defendant’s expertmedical causation witness is not qualified to render an expert opinion regarding whether hisexposures to allegedly asbestos-contaminated talc could cause Mr. Sorum’s mesothelioma.However, the Court disallows consideration of the Burns Declaration (Defendant’s Index of SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 23CV031203: SORUM, et al. vs ALBERTSONS COMPANIES, INC., INDIVIDUALLY, et al. 07/26/2024 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by KOLMAR LABORATORIES, INC (Defendant) in Department 18Exhibits (“DIOE”) Exh. 1) solely as to the present dispositive motion because the movingSeparate Statement does not comply with the requirements of CRC Rule 3.1350(d)(3).Specifically, Defendant’s Separate Statement does not cite to the Burns Declaration by“reference to exhibit, title, page, and line numbers.” Instead, the Burns Declaration incorporatesby reference all of her 65-page, single-spaced expert witness report with no citation to anyspecific portions that are relevant to the disposition of this motion. The Court lacks the judicialresources to review a document of this length. Further, the Court’s limited review of the Burnsexpert witness report indicates that much of the content is not directly relevant to the dispositionof this Motion, for example, recitation of Mr. Sorum’s alleged exposures to products other thantalcum powder products, Burns’ rates for deposition testimony, Mr. Sorum’s use of talcumpowder products not alleged to be attributable to Defendant, and the history of smoking in hisfamily. The Court cannot expeditiously determine whether there is an adequate foundation forexpert Burns’ opinions relevant to this Motion, specifically, whether Mr. Sorum’s allegedexposures to Defendant’s cosmetic talc products could have been a substantial factor in causinghis malignant mesothelioma. Pages 41-43 of the Burns expert report constitute three pages ofassumptions made by Defendant’s expert, but none of the actual source materials upon which shebases her assumptions are attached to the report for the Court to consider. On this basis, theCourt SUSTAINS Plaintiff’s Objection No. 1 on the grounds that the Burns Declaration is toospeculative solely with respect to the present motion.The Court OVERRULES Plaintiffs’ Objection No. 2 on the grounds of hearsay. The Court mayconsider deposition transcripts on summary judgment/adjudication. (CCP § 437c(b)(1).The Court SUSTAINS Plaintiffs’ Objection No. 3. Verified Interrogatory Responses may onlybe offered in evidence against the responding party. (CCP § 2030.410.)The Court OVERRULES Defendant’s Reply Objection Nos. 1-5.The Court reminds Defendant that paper courtesy copies of motion papers must be provided toDept. 18 pursuant to Local Rule 3.30(c) not later than the day after timely filing.CONTESTING TENTATIVE ORDERSNotify the Court and all other parties no later than 4:00 pm the day before the scheduled hearingand identify the issues you wish to argue through the following steps:1. Log into eCourt Public Portal - https://eportal.alameda.courts.ca.gov2. Case Search3. Enter the Case Number and select Search4. Select the Case Name5. Select the Tentative Rulings Tab6. Select Click to Contest this Ruling SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA23CV031203: SORUM, et al. vs ALBERTSONS COMPANIES, INC., INDIVIDUALLY, et al. 07/26/2024 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by KOLMAR LABORATORIES, INC (Defendant) in Department 187. Enter your Name and Reason for Contesting8. Select Proceed.

Ruling

ANH L. TROUNG VS. RUBY TANG ET AL

Jul 22, 2024 |CGC23604728

Matter on the Law & Motion calendar for Monday, July 22, 2024, Line 2. 2 - DEFENDANT RUBY TANG's Motion For Sanctions And Compensation Against Taghi Astanehe, Anh L. Truong And Anh L. Troung Pursuant Ccp 128.5, 128.7 And 1033.5. Denied. The motion appears to seek sanctions against a person who is no longer a party to the case, and the person's counsel. The other motion brought by Ms. Tang today, that relating to sealing, states that the entire case was dismissed February 21, 2024. None of the grounds alleged is shown to be frivolous within the meaning of the statutes invoked, i.e., CCP sections 128.5, 128.7. For the 9:30 a.m. Law & Motion calendar, all attorneys and parties may appear in Department 302 remotely. Remote hearings will be conducted by videoconference using Zoom. To appear remotely at the hearing, go to the court's website at sfsuperiorcourt.org under "Online Services," navigate to "Tentative Rulings," and click on the appropriate link, or dial the corresponding phone number. Any party who contests a tentative ruling must send an email to contestdept302tr@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties by 4pm stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. The subject line of the email shall include the line number, case name and case number. The text of the email shall include the name and contact information, including email address, of the attorney or party who will appear at the hearing. Counsel for the prevailing party is required to prepare a proposed order which repeats verbatim the substantive portion of the tentative ruling and must email it to contestdept302tr@sftc.org prior to the hearing even if the tentative ruling is not contested. The court no longer provides a court reporter in the Law & Motion Department. Parties may retain their own reporter, who may appear in the courtroom or remotely. A retained reporter must be a California certified court reporter (CSR), for only a CSR's transcript may be used in California courts. If a CSR is being retained, include in your email all of the following: their name, CSR and telephone numbers, and their individual work email address. =(302/CK)

Ruling

ORLANDO GARCIA VS WAYNE LEE, ET AL.

Jul 25, 2024 |23PSCV01547

Case Number: 23PSCV01547 Hearing Date: July 25, 2024 Dept: 6 Plaintiff Orlando Garcias Request for Entry of Default Judgment Defendants: Wayne Lee and Rayed Abdulnour TENTATIVE RULING Plaintiffs request for entry of default judgment is DENIED without prejudice. BACKGROUND This is an ADA/Unruh Civil Rights Act case. On May 22, 2023, plaintiff Orlando Garcia (Plaintiff) filed this action against defendants Wayne Lee (Wayne),[1] Rayed Abdulnour (Rayed), and Does 1 through 50, alleging one cause of action for violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act. Default was entered against Rayed on August 10, 2023. On May 2, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiffs motion to strike Waynes answer. On May 28, 2024, default was entered against Wayne. LEGAL STANDARD Code of Civil Procedure section 585 permits entry of a default judgment after a party has failed to timely respond or appear. (Code Civ. Proc., § 585.) A party seeking judgment on the default by the court must file a Request for Court Judgment, and: (1) a brief summary of the case; (2) declarations or other admissible evidence in support of the judgment requested; (3) interest computations as necessary; (4) a memorandum of costs and disbursem*nts; (5) declaration of nonmilitary status; (6) a proposed form of judgment; (7) a dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought or an application for separate judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 579, supported by a showing of grounds for each judgment; (8) exhibits as necessary; and (9) a request for attorneys fees if allowed by statute or by the agreement of the parties. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1800.) ANALYSIS Plaintiff seeks default judgment against Defendants in the total amount of $14,524.09, including $4,000.00 in damages, $8,600.00 in attorney fees, and $1,924.09 in costs. The Court notes a few issues with the default judgment package. First, Plaintiffs memorandum of costs includes $200.00 in investigation fees, which are not recoverable as costs. (CIV-100, ¶ 7, subd. (c); see Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (b)(2) [pretrial investigation costs not recoverable].) Second, the Court also notes that Plaintiff improperly included the high frequency litigation filing fees with the process server fees in the memorandum of costs. (CIV-100, ¶ 7, subd. (b); Reddy Decl., Ex. 2, p. 50.) Third, the Court finds Plaintiffs request for attorneys fees in the amount of $8,600.00 to be excessive. Plaintiff is a high frequency litigant. (Compl., ¶ 28.) All this case has involved thus far is the filing and service of the complaint, a single unopposed motion to strike, and requests for entry of default and default judgment. While the Court is not necessarily bound by the limits of the fee schedule for default judgments under Local Rule 3.214, the Court is not inclined to award the amount Plaintiff requests here. The Court will not include amounts billed for administrative work such as filing documents and will not allow for more than 1 hour for appearances for court conferences and OSC hearings. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs request for entry of default judgment is DENIED without prejudice. [1] The complaint also originally included a defendant Frances N. Lee, but that apparently was in error, and Frances N. Lee was removed from this action on October 30, 2023.

Ruling

Warner, Sam vs. Auburn Racquet Club, Inc.

Aug 05, 2024 |S-CV-0051945

S-CV-0051945 Warner, Sam vs. Auburn Racquet Club, Inc.** NOTE: telephonic appearances are strongly encouragedAppearance required. Complaint is not at issue - Need responsive pleading,default or dismissal as to Defendant(s): Auburn Racquet Club, Inc.

Ruling

CONSUMER ADVOCACY GROUP, INC. VS MIDLAND HARDWARE COMPANY NO. 4, ET AL.

Jul 29, 2024 |21STCV02859

Case Number: 21STCV02859 Hearing Date: July 29, 2024 Dept: 53 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Central District Department 53 consumer advocacy group, inc. ; Plaintiff, vs. midland hardware company no. 4 , et al.; Defendants. Case No.: 21STCV02859 Hearing Date: July 29, 2024 Time: 10:00 a.m. [tentative] Order RE: plaintiffs motion to approve and enter consent judgment MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Consumer Advocacy Group, Inc. RESPONDING PARTY: Unopposed Motion to Approve and Enter Consent Judgment The court considered the moving papers filed in connection with this motion. No opposition papers were filed. DISCUSSION Plaintiff Consumer Advocacy Group, Inc. (Plaintiff) moves the court for an order approving and entering the [Proposed] Consent Judgment entered into between Plaintiff, on the one hand, and defendant Kittrich Corporation (Defendant), on the other hand, pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 25249.7. Actions brought under the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986 (the Act) require court approval of settlements. A plaintiff is required to submit the settlement, other than a voluntary dismissal in which no consideration is received from the defendant, to the court for approval upon noticed motion . . . . (Health & Safety Code § 25249.7, subd. (f)(4).) [T]he court may approve the settlement only if the court makes all of the following findings: (A) The warning that is required by the settlement complies with this chapter. (B) The award of attorneys fees is reasonable under California law. (C) The penalty amount is reasonable based on the criteria set forth in paragraph (2) of subdivision (b). (Health & Safety Code, § 25249.7, subd. (f)(4).) The plaintiff seeking approval of the settlement has the burden of producing evidence sufficient to sustain each required finding. The plaintiff shall serve the motion and all supporting papers on the Attorney General, who may appear and participate in a proceeding without intervening in the case. (Health & Safety Code, § 25249.7, subd. (f)(5).) First, the court finds that Plaintiff has submitted a proof of service establishing service of the pending motion and supporting documents on the Office of the Attorney General 45 days before the hearing on this motion and therefore has complied with the service requirements. (Health & Safety Code, § 25249.7, subd. (f)(5); 11 CCR § 3003, subd. (a); June 14, 2024 Proof of Service, pp. 2-4.) As of July 24, 2024, the Office of the Attorney General did not object to or comment further on the proposed Consent Judgment, although the court does not construe the absence of this objection to be an endorsem*nt or concurrence of the parties settlement. (July 24, 2024 Yeroushalmi Decl., ¶ 7; 11 CCR § 3003, subd. (a).) Second, the court finds that Plaintiff has shown that the warning that is required by the Consent Judgment complies with the Act. (Health & Safety Code, § 25249.7, subd. (f)(4)(A).) No person in the course of doing business shall knowingly and intentionally expose any individual to a chemical known to the state to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity without first giving clear and reasonable warning to such individual, except as provided in Section 25249.10. (Health & Safety Code, § 25249.6.) A warning is clear and reasonable within the meaning of the Act if (1) the name of one or more of the listed chemicals is included in the text of the warning, and (2) the warning is prominently displayed on a label, labeling, or sign, and displayed with such conspicuousness as compared with other words, statements, designs, or devices on the label, labelling, or sign, as to render the warning likely to be seen, read, and understood by an ordinary individual under customary conditions of purchase or use. (27 CCR § 25601, subds. (a), (b), (c).) Defendant has agreed that (1) Defendant shall not order any covered products for sale into California with any component that contains Diisononyl Phthalate in excess of 0.1 percent by weight; (2) for any covered products that Defendant sells, distributes, or ships into California after the effective date (i.e., the date on which the Consent Judgment is approved by the court) that were ordered before the effective date must contain a clear and reasonable warning for cancer unless it contains no more than 0.1 percent by weight of Diisononyl Phthalate; (3) such warnings shall be affixed to the packaging of, or directly on, or attached to the covered products, and shall be prominently placed with such conspicuousness as compared with other words, statements, designs, or devices as to render it likely to be read and understood by an ordinary individual under customary conditions; and (4) covered products already distributed to downstream releasees prior to the effective date may continue to be sold as-is. (Yeroushalmi Decl., Ex. A, Proposed Consent Judgment, ¶¶ 3.3-3.3.) Moreover, Defendant has agreed not to sell or distribute the covered products in existing inventory for sale over the internet without providing a warning in the manner provided for with respect to internet sales. (Yeroushalmi Decl., Ex. A, Proposed Consent Judgment, ¶ 3.3.) The court finds that these warnings satisfy the Acts requirements. Second, the court finds that the award of attorneys fees is reasonable under California law. (Health & Safety Code, § 25249.7, subd. (f)(4)(B).) [T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the lodestar, i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. . . . .¿ The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.¿ The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.¿ (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 [internal citations omitted]; Reck v. FCA US LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 682, 691 [To determine a reasonable attorney fee award, the trial court applies the lodestar method].) Defendant has agreed to pay attorneys fees to Plaintiff in the total amount of $325,000. (Yeroushalmi Decl., Ex. A, Proposed Consent Judgment, ¶ 4.1.3.) Plaintiff has submitted the declaration of its counsel, in which counsel attests to the skills, qualifications, experience, and hourly rates of the attorneys, law clerks, and support staff who worked on this action. (Yeroushalmi Decl., ¶¶ 10, 13-15.) The court finds that the hourly rates requested are reasonable in light of the skills, qualifications, and experience of counsel, the law clerks, and the legal support staff. (Yeroushalmi Decl., ¶¶ 10 [$990 hourly rate for Yeroushalmi], 13 [$530 hourly rate for Royster], 14 [$435 hourly rate for Allen, $475 hourly rate for Liao, and $435 hourly rate for Purcell], 15, subd. (a) [$250 hourly rate for law clerks Sengupta, Singh, and Grams], 15, subd. (b) [$95 hourly rate for administrative assistants Klyczek and Suh].) Plaintiffs counsel has also attested, in his declaration, that the attorneys, law clerks, and legal staff expended a total number of 633.2 hours in this action. (Yeroushalmi Decl., ¶ 23.) The court finds that the number of hours expended in this action to investigate Defendants alleged violations of Proposition 65, draft the Complaint, engage in discovery and prepare and file various discovery motions, and settle this action with Defendant is reasonable. (Yeroushalmi Decl., ¶¶ 27 [work performed regarding investigation and notices], 28 [complaint-related work], 29 [work performed regarding discovery], 30 [settlement-related work].) Thus, the court finds that Plaintiff has established a lodestar figure of $349,642. (Yeroushalmi Decl., ¶ 23.) The court therefore finds that the award of $325,000 in attorneys fees in the Consent Judgment is reasonable under California law. Third, the court finds that the penalty amount is reasonable based on the criteria set forth in Health and Safety Code section 25249.7, subdivision (b)(2). In assessing the amount of a civil penalty for a violation of this chapter, the court should consider all of the following: (1) the nature and extent of the violation; (2) the number of, and severity of, the violations; (3) the economic effect of the penalty on the violator; (4) whether the violator took good faith measures to comply with the Act and the time these measures were taken; (5) the willfulness of the violators misconduct; (6) the deterrent effect that the imposition of the penalty would have on both the violator and regulated community as a whole; and (7) any other factor that justice may require. (Health & Safety Code, § 25249.7, subd. (b)(2).) Pursuant to the Consent Judgment, Defendant will issue two separate checks in the total amount of $57,156 for civil penalties, to be allocated as follows: (1) $42,867 (totaling 75 percent of the civil penalty) will be paid to the State of Californias Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment, and (2) $14,289 (totaling 25 percent of the civil penalty) will be paid to Plaintiff. (Yeroushalmi Decl., Ex. A, Consent Judgment, ¶¶ 4.1-4.1.1.) After considering the factors set forth in section 25249.7 and the evidence submitted by Plaintiff, including that 75 percent of the penalty will be paid to the State of Californias Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment, the court finds that the civil penalty is reasonable. (Yeroushalmi Decl., ¶¶ 6, 7 [the DINP exposure is a severe violation due to its highly toxic nature], 8 [although Plaintiff attempted to resolve this issue prior to filing suit, Defendant has expressed willingness to reformulate the product], 9 [the agreement to pay civil penalties was reached through arms-length negotiations]; Yeroushalmi Decl., Ex. B [Certificate of Analysis]; 11 CCR § 3203 [setting forth the other factors that justice may require].) Finally, the court finds that Plaintiff has shown that it is in the public interest to offset the civil penalty required by statute with the additional settlement payment to Plaintiff in the amount of $42,844 because (1) it does not exceed the $42,867 civil penalty to be deposited to the State of Californias Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment; (2) the Consent Judgment limits its use of this additional settlement payment to cover the fees for the investigation and testing of the Proposition 65-listed chemical and the administrative costs incurred during the investigation and litigation to reduce the publics exposure to the Proposition 65-listed chemical, which (i) has a clear and substantial nexus to Defendants alleged violation of the Act and (ii) is sufficiently specific; (3) the recipient thereof is an entity that is accountable (i.e., Plaintiff); and (4) the Consent Judgment requires Plaintiff to, within 30 days of a request from the Attorney General, provide copies of documentation demonstrating how the funds have been spent. (11 CCR §§ 3203, subd. (d), 3204, subds. (b)(1)-(b)(6); Yeroushalmi Decl., Ex. A, Consent Judgment, ¶ 4.1.2; Yeroushalmi Decl., ¶ 3; Marcus Decl., ¶¶ 6-12, 14.) Thus, the court finds that Plaintiff has met its burden to establish that the Consent Judgment entered into by and between it and Defendant complies with the Act and is reasonable. (Health & Safety Code, § 25249.7, subds. (f)(4), (f)(5).) The court therefore grants Plaintiffs motion. ORDER The court grants plaintiff Consumer Advocacy Group, Inc.s motion to approve and enter consent judgment. The court will sign and file the proposed Consent Judgment, lodged with the court by plaintiff Consumer Advocacy Group, Inc. on June 14, 2024. The court orders plaintiff Consumer Advocacy Group, Inc. to give notice of this ruling. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: July 29, 2024 _____________________________ Robert B. Broadbelt III Judge of the Superior Court

Ruling

LODIE POLLARD ET AL VS HAIG M BAZOIAN ET AL

Jul 26, 2024 |BC718464

Case Number: BC718464 Hearing Date: July 26, 2024 Dept: A LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT NORTH CENTRAL DISTRICT - BURBANK DEPARTMENT A CONTINUANCE JULY 26, 2024 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Los Angeles Superior Court Case # BC718464 MP: The City of Los Angeles (Defendant) RP: Lodie Pollard, Luna Skyy Pollard, Jayden Devaughn Carter, and Pink Selkin (Plaintiffs) NOTICE: The Court is not requesting oral argument on this matter. The Court is guided by California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1) whereby notice of intent to appear is requested. Unless the Court directs argument in the Tentative Ruling, no argument is requested and any party seeking argument should notify all other parties and the court by 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing of the partys intention to appear and argue. The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if no argument is received. Notice may be given either by email at BurDeptA@LACourt.org or by telephone at (818) 260-8412. ANALYSIS: On July 19, 2024 the Los Angeles Superior Court suffered a cyber security attack which resulted in the significant impairment of most Court systems. Due to this complication, additional time is required for the Court to review these motions and issue a tentative ruling. The Court, on its own motion, thus continues the motions for summary judgment brought by the City of Los Angeles to August 14, 2024 at 9:00 a.m. --- RULING: In the event the parties submit on this tentative ruling, or a party requests a signed order or the court in its discretion elects to sign a formal order, the following form will be either electronically signed or signed in hard copy and entered into the courts records. ORDER The City of Los Angeless Motions for Summary Judgment came on regularly for hearing on Jukly 26, 2024, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows: THE MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ARE CONTINUED TO AUGUST 14, 2024 AT 9:00 AM. ALL OTHER DATES REMAIN. DEFENDANT CITY OF LOS ANGELES TO GIVE NOTICE. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATE: July 26, 2024 _______________________________ F.M. TAVELMAN, Judge Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles

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